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INTRODUCTION
More than 1.4 billion people in the world live below the poverty
line, defined by the World Bank as 1.25 U.S. dollars per day.1 People
living at or below the poverty line are vulnerable to disease,
starvation, and the natural elements and are deprived of medicines,
knowledge, and power over the international laws and economic
dispositions that affect their daily lives. However, what does this
have to do with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(“ACTA”)2—the subject of secretive negotiations by the United
States, Europe, and a few close allies? ACTA is, after all, described
by its advocates as a trade agreement. Little attention has been paid
to its potential impact on the world’s poorest people. This article
points to some of the ways in which ACTA will almost certainly
threaten their interests.
ACTA itself is part of a far bigger agenda: the “enforcement
agenda.” The enforcement agenda, under the guise of strengthening
the enforcement of existing rights, attempts to enact national laws
and create policies and practices which effectively eliminate existing
limitations and exceptions in the current international intellectual
property regime, at least with regard to cross border regulation of
intellectual property.3 ACTA is the pre-eminent vehicle of the
1. See Shaohua Chen & Martin Ravallion, The Developing World Is Poorer
Than We Thought, But No Less Successful in the Fight against Poverty 34 (World
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4703, 2008), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/JAPANINJAPANESEEXT/Resources/5154971201490097949/080827_The_Developing_World_is_Poorer_than_we_Thought.p
df (documenting by region a general reduction in the number of poor living below
$1.25 a day from 1.9 billion in 1981 to approximately 1.4 billion in 2005).
2. The text of ACTA referred to throughout this article, unless otherwise
specified, is the December 3, 2010 text released by the Australian government. See
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Dec. 3, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA
Text―Dec. 3, 2010], available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/acta/Final-ACTAtext-following-legal-verification.pdf.
3. See William New & Kaitlin Mara, Near-Finished Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Pact Could Have Broad Reach, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct. 12, 2010,
7:27PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/10/12/rights-holders%E2%80%
99-anti-counterfeiting-trade-pact-could-have-broad-reach/ (highlighting that the
October draft of ACTA goes well beyond the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) by exercising more power over
third parties, providing specific damages for an injured party, and relaxing limits
on government officials in charge of inspecting goods, all resulting in reductions of
safeguards).
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enforcement agenda. Developing countries have had a number of
recent experiences with the enforcement agenda that provide
concrete examples of the likely impact of ACTA. This article sets out
to describe in plain terms this likely impact. Doing so requires an
understanding of the enforcement agenda and its primary vehicle,
i.e., ACTA, and this requires drawing on a great deal of work by
others, some of which is yet to even be published. This paper
describes ACTA as both a process and a set of provisions, examines
its emergence in the enforcement agenda, and discusses how ACTA
threatens multinational development, especially access to medicines
and access to knowledge.

I. WHAT IS AT STAKE?
At one time intellectual property (“IP”) law was viewed by both
the public in the developed world and by most developing country
policy-makers as a purely technocratic domain. Reliance on expertise
effectively disguised political choices. While this view has changed,
it is too often forgotten that IP laws disproportionately impact the
world’s poorest people. How will the enforcement agenda affect the
lives of these individuals? Will it fracture the multinational IP
regime? Will it derail international cooperation on health, renewable
energy, or food security?

II. THE ENFORCEMENT AGENDA
The “enforcement agenda” is a sustained, wide-ranging effort by
lobbyists for certain industries in crisis to deploy state resources,
secure legislation, and institutionalize practices that support their
current business models under the banner of enforcing IP rights.
Consequently, “[t]he overall picture that emerges is a web of
numerous multilateral forums, regional and bilateral agreements and
unilateral institutions being captured to pursue a global TRIPS-plus4
enforcement agenda.”5
4. The term “TRIPS-plus” refers to provisions in international instruments, or
regulatory schemes adopted in accordance therewith, that exceed the minimum
standards required by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
5. Viviana Muñoz Tellez, The Changing Global Governance of Intellectual

786

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[26:3

The agenda is being realized through a range of means, including
ACTA, increasingly onerous enforcement provisions in Free Trade
Agreements (“FTAs”),6 and far reaching national legislation on
“counterfeits” (often the results of “expert technical assistance”).7
Muñoz Tellez lists thirteen different international fora in which
enforcement efforts are being pursued.8
Multinational tobacco, pharmaceutical, film, and record
corporations are setting the enforcement agenda. The Global
Business Leaders’ Alliance Against Counterfeiting (“GBLAAC”),
whose members include Coca-Cola, Daimler Chrysler, Pfizer,
Proctor and Gamble, American Tobacco, Phillip Morris, Swiss
Watch, Nike, and Canon, sponsored the meeting on counterfeiting,
held in Geneva and hosted by Interpol and the World Intellectual
Property Organization (“WIPO”), which led to the public ACTA
process.9 The primary lobbying bodies include the Motion Picture
Association, the Recording Industry Association of America, the
International Intellectual Property Alliance, and the Business
Software Alliance, in addition to global pharmaceutical giants and

Property Enforcement: A New Challenge for Developing Countries, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 10
(Xuan Li & Carlos M. Correa eds., 2009).
6. A “Free Trade Agreement” is a type of bilateral trade agreement that is not
confined to trade as traditionally understood as exchange of goods, but rather
includes requirements for changes to the national legislation of signatories, most
notably IP legislation.
7. See, e.g., Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, §§ 301, 402, 122 Stat 4256 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15, 17, and 18 U.S.C.) (creating the Intellectual
Property Enforcement Coordinator, a specialized office charged with combating
piracy and counterfeiting, in addition to providing for investigative and forensic
resources to improve prosecution of such crimes).
8. See Tellez, supra note 5, at 11 (illustrating that institutions, such as the
World Health Organization, World Intellectual Property Organization, the World
Trade Organization, International Police Organization, and the Council for TRIPS
are now involved in IP enforcement, for instance by promoting IP enforcement
through border measures).
9. See Aaron Shaw, The Problem with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (and what to do about it), 2 KESTUDIES, at 2 (2008),
http://kestudies.org/ojs/index.php/kes/article/view/34/57 (suggesting that the
GBLAAC-sponsored conference in Geneva spurred a movement for stricter
regulations to tackle “piracy” and counterfeiting that included subsequent summits
and publications on prevention and enforcement).
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global tobacco companies.10
One significant feature of the agenda includes a reduction or
elimination of exceptions and limitations to IP law through overbroad provisions purportedly aimed to discourage and punish
infringement.11 Examples from East Africa illustrate this effect,
where advocates have sought to move the focus of international and
national IP policy away from efforts to ensure access to medicines
and access to knowledge, and instead to dedicate resources to
expanding the reach and impact of the statutory monopolies granted
by IP legislation.12 The enforcement agenda is often framed in terms
of security, which justifies inroads into civil liberties, recruits new
constituencies to the political economy of IP maximization, and
attempts to stigmatize critics.13 As the enforcement agenda unfolds
across a range of arenas, the impact on real life situations becomes
all too clear, presaging the effects of ACTA.

10. A peculiar difficulty surrounds ACTA with respect to both the text and the
process; the text was withheld from the public and largely from the public's duly
appointed representatives, and the negotiation process did not take place on the
public record.
11. See Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev. [ICTSD], India Moves to
Protect Traditional Medicines, 13 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., no. 7, Feb
25, 2009, available at http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/41660/ (detailing that
the Indian government, who licensed 2,000 traditional treatments and has future
plans to patent yoga techniques, is one of several countries including Kenya,
Brazil, Pakistan, and Switzerland pushing for a TRIPS amendment that will protect
“traditional knowledge”).
12. See, e.g., Press Release, Oxfam, Secret Plans to Criminalize Generic
Medicines Could Hurt Poor Countries and People (July 15, 2009),
http://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressrelease/2009-07-15/criminalize-genericmedicines-hurt-poor-countries (noting that proponents of ACTA will likely push
for provisions that make it harder for companies to send generic medicines to poor
people in developing states through “parallel importation,” leading to a lack of
access to medicine).
13. See Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and
Piracy Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play 8 (IQsensato, 2008), available at
http://www.iqsensato.org/wpcontent/uploads/Sell_IP_Enforcement_State_of_Play-OPs_1_June_2008.pdf
(asserting that ACTA will grant border agents the authority to conduct searches of
electronic devices, such as laptops, iPods, and cellular phones, and to initiate
wiretaps without due process of law, thereby using taxpayer dollars to enforce
private rights).
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III. ACTA
What is ACTA? Although the few official government
announcements on ACTA have described it as a draft treaty
agreement, developing countries might see it as an immensely
complex strategy for forum-shifting by certain multinational
corporations. Susan Sell described the current negotiations as the
latest iteration in a longer process:
Since the early 1980s advocates of a maximalist IP agenda have shifted
forums both horizontally and vertically in order to achieve their goals.
Those who seek to ration access to IP are engaged in an elaborate cat and
mouse game with those who seek to expand access. As soon as one venue
becomes less responsive to a high protectionist agenda, IP protectionists
shift to another in search of a more hospitable venue.14

Sell explained how those seeking ever-increasing IP rights shifted
forum from WIPO to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), back
to WIPO, and then to bilateral trade agreements and multiple other
fora.15

A. THE ACTA PROCESS
ACTA was negotiated by trade representatives from the United
States, Australia, Canada, the European Commission, Japan, Mexico,
Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, and South Korea. Official
statements by negotiators, such as the European Commission Trade
Office, claim that ACTA “does not purport to create new intellectual
property rights but to create improved international standards as to

14. Id. at 4.
15. See id.
Once the access to medicines coalition of developing countries and NGOs mobilized
in the WTO, the IP maximalists renewed their earlier WIPO deliberations on a
Substantive Patent Law Treaty (“SPLT”) in an effort to secure IP protection that went
beyond TRIPS. However, the mobilized medicines coalition paid attention to WIPO
and tried to counter this quest with a Development Agenda for WIPO. The ensuing
stalemate at WIPO over the SPLT led the IP maximalists to pursue other avenues,
including continued bilateral and regional trade and investment treaties marked by
TRIPS-Plus provisions as well as this new pluri-lateral effort behind the IP
enforcement agenda. Industry has been relentless pursuing its IP agenda and
circumventing developing country and NGO opposition, favoring non-transparent
forums of ‘like-minded’ actors.

Id.
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how to act against large-scale infringements of [IP rights].”16 Despite
this claim, ACTA provisions stipulate penalties for non-commercial
infringement,17 provide measures against a wide range of third
parties,18 create new categories of rights,19 and effectively eliminate
exceptions and limitations granted by TRIPS.20 Some states at times
present ACTA as a tough but practical means to secure their trade
interests in economically difficult times. The reality is more
complex:
The main actors in the ACTA process are “nodal actors” or networks of
state and private sector actors who coordinate their positions and enroll
nodal actors to help the cause. These are not single issue coalitions of
states, but rather a mélange of private and public sector actors who share
compatible goals and continue to coordinate their negotiating positions
over time and across forums.21

ACTA is being negotiated outside all of existing multinational
frameworks and would create an entirely new international
organization. Once the parties settle on the provisions, the rules will
be applied to developing countries, especially emerging economies.
According to the European Commission Trade Office, “[t]he
16. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) Fact Sheet, EUR. COMM’N
TRADE OFF. 1 (Nov. 2008), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/
tradoc_140836.11.08.pdf [hereinafter ACTA Fact Sheet].
17. See, e.g., ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 2, arts. 7-12, 13. Article
10, for example, requires that judicial authorities have the power to order the
destruction of “pirated copyright goods” and “counterfeit trademark goods,” both
of which are so defined as to include non-commercial infringement.
18. See, e.g., id. art. 8.1 (requiring that parties give their judicial authorities
power to “prevent goods that involve an infringement of an intellectual property
right from entering into the channels of commerce”); id. art. 12 (setting forth the
requirement that parties give their judicial authorities power to order “prompt and
effective provisional measures . . . against a third party”).
19. See, e.g., id. § 3 on Border Measures enables a right holder in a country
though which goods are transported to prevent the transit of goods through that
country and to require their seizure and destruction.
20. See infra Part V.C (discussing ACTA's potential to undermine TRIPS
safeguards for the right to access information).
21. Sell, supra note 13, at 5. Sell derives the term “nodal actors” from Peter
Drahos, Four Lessons for Developing Countries from the Trade Negotiations over
access to Medicines, 28 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 11, 35 (2007). “Drahos states that
‘there is considerable evidence that the US runs its trade negotiation as a form of
networked governance rather than as a simple process of domestic coalition
building.’” Sell, supra note 13, at 5.
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ultimate objective is that large emerging economies, where [IP
rights] enforcement could be improved, such as China or Russia, will
sign up to the global pact.”22 Although official notification of the
process leading to ACTA was first announced in 2007, April 21,
2010 was the first time an official draft became publicly available,
and then only after widespread protest and the leaking of previous
drafts.23

B. ACTA PROVISIONS
Any discussion of ACTA’s provisions suffers from the secrecy of
the process. At the time of writing only three public drafts had been
released and two of those were redacted. The third, distributed in
October 2010, purported to require no further negotiations but was
indeterminate in key respects. Yet another draft dated November 15,
2010 has been made public, with at least one significant change but
without resolving other important issues.24
A putatively “final” text was released by the Australian
government in December 2010. However, even this text is opaque,
rendering possible multiple interpretations. In the context of
international trade and intellectual property, this ambiguity will serve
the enforcement agenda through further enabling the culture of
technocratic expertise to disguise the policy choices at stake. For
developing countries, therefore, the potential rupture zone around
each provision, rather than the precise wording of provisions,
requires attention.
In addition, as the interception of medicines by the Dutch and
German customs authorities25 shows, government officials often
22. ACTA Fact Sheet, supra note 16, at 2.
23. See ACTA - Text and Leaked Documents, PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. &
INTELL. PROP. [PIJIP] IP ENFORCEMENT DATABASE, https://sites.google.com/site/
iipenforcement/acta (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (showing that an ACTA text was
leaked in March before an official release was provided in April and recording that
in 2010, the text of ACTA was leaked at least thirteen times and official
government memos on ACTA were leaked at least five times).
24. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Subject to Legal Review art.
2.18 ¶ 2, Nov. 15, 2010, available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2379. In
startling contrast to previous practice, this November version was made available
on the website of the office of the United States Trade Representative. Australia
released a “final” version on December 3, 2010.
25. See EC Customs Law, TPA CUSTOMS NEWSLETTER (TPA Global,
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disregard the nuances of legislative drafting.
ACTA’s first chapter sets out initial provisions and definitions.
Several key definitions were introduced only in the October 2010
version of the text.26 The second chapter, on enforcement, sets out
provisions that require changes to national laws. In the “final” text of
ACTA, most of these provisions are crafted as requirements that
judicial authorities be given “authority” to grant certain remedies,
such as injunctions, without hearing all the parties affected. A court
is not required to grant the remedy in each case—but must have the
power to grant such a remedy. The effect on procedural guarantees is
subtle but pernicious. In each instance a signatory must require its
courts to make available certain remedies, and thus a court must
entertain claims for such required remedies, refusing them only if it
has good reason to do so. Furthermore, ACTA does not provide any
guidance on when a judicial authority may refuse a demand for such
remedies, and neither the legislature nor the judiciary may rule that a
particular remedy is generally inappropriate. These procedural
requirements therefore disregard the competence of courts to regulate
their own procedure, especially the granting of injunctions in
common law countries. Interference in the constitutional separation
of powers is generally regarded as well beyond the ambit of trade
agreements.
The final version of Article 9 on damages may well have
disappointed some organized industry representatives. The final
structure of the section is somewhat convoluted and requires careful
parsing. Article 9.1 requires damages not only for intentional
infringement but for infringement by a party with “reasonable
grounds to know” that the conduct was infringing.27 A court “shall
Amsterdam, Neth.), Nov. 2009, at 2, available at http://www.tpaglobal.com/
PDF/Publications/011109_TPA-Customs_Newsletter.pdf (recounting the Dutch
seizure of generic medicines, patented in the Netherlands but not in India, the port
of origin, because the items were suspected of being counterfeit).
26. For the first time, “counterfeit trademark goods” and “pirated copyright
goods” were defined in the text. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Informal
Predecisional/Deliberative Draft art. 1.X, Oct. 2, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft—
Oct. 2, 2010], available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/
october/tradoc_146699.pdf.
27. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 2, art. 9.1 (“Each Party shall
provide that, in civil judicial proceedings concerning the enforcement of
intellectual property rights, its judicial authorities have the authority to order the
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have the authority to consider” “any legitimate measure” of damages
which by fiat if not by logic “may include lost profits, the value of
the infringed goods or services measured by the market price or the
suggested retail price.”28 Does this subsection use the word “shall” in
a directory way or in a peremptory way—as it is used in Article
9.3?29 If the word is used in a peremptory manner then at least under
that interpretation it requires a court to consider the listed “measures
of value” as legitimate measures. Article 9.3 requires a signatory in
respect of copyright and trademark infringement claims to provide
damages which are “pre-established,” presumed,30 or additional
damages.31 A rights-holder or a court must be able to elect to use
“pre-established” or “presum[ed]” damages as an alternative to the
legitimate measures of value set out in Article 9.1.32 The result is
infringer who, knowingly or with reasonable grounds to know, engaged in
infringing activity to pay the right holder damages adequate to compensate for the
injury the right holder has suffered as a result of the infringement.”).
28. Id.
29. See id. art 9.3 (“At least with respect to infringement of copyright or
related rights protecting works, phonograms, and performances, and in cases of
trademark counterfeiting, each Party shall also establish or maintain a system that
provides for one or more of the following:(a) pre-established damages; or
(b) presumptions for determining the amount of damages sufficient to compensate
the right holder for the harm caused by the infringement; or(c) at least for
copyright, additional damages.”) (emphasis added).
30. What is meant by “presumed” is elaborated in ACTA’s footnote 3.
The presumptions referred to in subparagraph 3(b) may include a presumption that the
amount of damages is: (i) the quantity of the goods infringing the right holder’s
intellectual property right in question and actually assigned to third persons, multiplied
by the amount of profit per unit of goods which would have been sold by the right
holder if there had not been the act of infringement; or (ii) a reasonable royalty; or (iii)
a lump sum on the basis of elements such as at least the amount of royalties or fees
which would have been due if the infringer had requested authorization to use the
intellectual property right in question.

Id. n.3.
31. Id. art. 9.3.
32. Id. art. 9.4 (“Where a Party provides the remedy referred to in
subparagraph 3(a) or the presumptions referred to in subparagraph 3(b), it shall
ensure that either its judicial authorities or the right holder has the right to choose
such a remedy or presumptions as an alternative to the remedies referred to in
paragraphs 1 and 2.”) Paragraphs 1 and 2 are based on the logically fallacious
claim that every infringing copy distributed is equivalent to a lost sale or royalty
payment. Of course, the infringing copy would not necessarily be sold by a guilty
defendant at the plaintiff’s typical price. The defendant would likely sell for less so
as to make sales to those for whom the plaintiff’s price is too high. Therefore, sales
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that courts are bound to abandon the principle established in many
jurisdictions that damages must only compensate the claimant for the
diminution of value of his assets and not speculative losses. In this
section, ACTA seeks to overturn by fiat the basic economic principle
that as prices rise, demand decreases.33
The section also requires that courts must have the power to grant
injunctions without hearing the other party, in certain
circumstances,34 and to oblige alleged infringers to give information
about other parties without first proving the allegations of
infringement against them.35
The third section of Chapter Two regards so-called “border
measures.” A previous version of the agreement designated that such
measures apply to all the rights listed in the TRIPS agreement,
including trademarks, patents, copyrights, data protection, integrated
circuit protections, trade secrets, and geographical indications.36 In an
apparent response to widely raised concerns about access to
medicines, the final version of the text now states in footnote 6 that
to persons who would not or could not buy at plaintiff’s price are not really sales
lost as a result of the defendant’s actions.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Dove, 585 F. Supp. 2d 865, 870 (W.D. Va. 2008)
(explaining that “[i]t is a basic principle of economics that as price increases,
demand decreases [and] [c]ustomers who download music and movies for free
would not necessarily spend money to acquire the same product”).
34. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 2, art. 12.2 (“Each Party shall
provide that its judicial authorities have the authority to adopt provisional
measures inaudita altera parte where appropriate, in particular where any delay is
likely to cause irreparable harm to the right holder, or where there is a
demonstrable risk of evidence being destroyed. In proceedings conducted inaudita
altera parte, each Party shall provide its judicial authorities with the authority to
act expeditiously on requests for provisional measures and to make a decision
without undue delay.”).
35. See id. art. 11 (“Each Party shall provide that, in civil judicial proceedings
concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights, its judicial authorities
have the authority, upon a justified request of the right holder, to order the
infringer or, in the alternative, the alleged infringer, to provide to the right holder
or to the judicial authorities, at least for the purpose of collecting evidence,
relevant information as provided for in its applicable laws and regulations that the
infringer or alleged infringer possesses or controls.”).
36. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Public Predecisional/
Deliberative Draft art. 2.X ¶ 2 (Border Measures), Apr. 21, 2010, available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/april/tradoc_146029.pdf
(“For
the
purposes of this section, ‘goods infringing an intellectual property right’ means
goods infringing any of the IP rights covered by TRIPS.”).
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for the purposes of this agreement, “[t]he Parties agree that patents
and protection of undisclosed information do not fall within the
scope of this Section.”37
ACTA requires signatories to grant customs officials quasijudicial powers to decide complex matters of IP law, which they are
ill-suited to exercise.
Section 3 sets up requirements in respect of the novel category of
“suspect goods” that is nowhere defined in ACTA.38 Signatories
must grant powers to customs officials to seize “suspect goods,”39
and may empower those officials to seize goods in transit.40 Only
Article 16 refers explicitly to customs authorities, while the
remainder of Section 3 refers to “competent authorities”—defined so
as to enable signatories to include judicial authorities.41
Furthermore, ACTA mandates that customs authorities are able to
seize goods suspected of being potentially counterfeit. Signatories
are required to give competent authorities power to detain suspected
goods,42 provide information on origin of goods,43 determine
infringement, and order the destruction of property.
Border measures apply to the novel category of “counterfeit
trademark goods,” defined as the following:
37. ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 2, art. 13 n.6.
38. The phrase “suspect goods” is first used in Section 2 in Article 12.3 and
thereafter exclusively used in Section 3 on border measures.
39. See id. art. 16.1 (“Each Party shall adopt or maintain procedures with
respect to import and export shipments under which: (a) its customs authorities
may act upon their own initiative to suspend the release of suspect goods; and (b)
where appropriate, a right holder may request its competent authorities to suspend
the release of suspect goods.”).
40. See id. art 16.2 (“A Party may adopt or maintain procedures with respect to
suspect in-transit goods or in other situations where the goods are under customs
control under which: (a) its customs authorities may act upon their own initiative
to suspend the release of, or to detain, suspect goods; and (b) where appropriate, a
right holder may request its competent authorities to suspend the release of, or to
detain, suspect goods.”).
41. See id. art. 5(c) (stating that “competent authorities includes the appropriate
judicial, administrative, or law enforcement authorities under a Party’s law”).
42. Id. art 17.1.
43. See id. art. 22 (requiring a party to either give rights holders information
about specific shipments or give rights holders information on the origin and
destination of goods or, if not then for imported goods, on origin and destination of
goods that have been seized or determined to be infringing).
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[A]ny goods, including packaging, bearing without authorization a
trademark that is identical to the trademark validly registered in respect of
such goods, or that cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from
such a trademark, and that thereby infringes the rights of the owner of the
trademark in question under the law of the country in which the
procedures set out in Section 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Chapter 2 are invoked.44

Since border measures may apply to goods in transit, this
requirement effectively grants trademark holders a new right—the
right to prevent the transit of goods through a country in which they
are not offered for sale. Consequently, trademark law would
substantially change in most jurisdictions which require that goods
be offered for sale or commercially distributed in that jurisdiction
and that usually reserve penalties, such as the forfeiture and
destruction of goods, to courts upon proving intent to infringe a
trademark.45
Section 4, entitled “Criminal Enforcement,” requires
imprisonment as a possible sentence for infringement.46 Section 5
deals with the “digital environment.” The final text states that parties
may require service providers to provide information about third
parties, including commercially confidential and private information,
to rights holders alleging infringement.47 This Section makes use of
an ambivalent phrase, “adequate legal protection and effective legal
remedies,” which leaves the definition open for proponents of the
enforcement agenda to insist that such “adequate” remedies include
criminal sanctions.48
The third chapter, entitled “Enforcement Practices,” requires
signatories to commit resources to create specialized expertise on IP
44. Id. art. 1.X.
45. See, e.g., Counterfeit Goods Act 37 of 1997, as amended in 2001 §20(1) (S.
Afr.) (allowing a court, upon conviction, to declare counterfeit goods to be
forfeited or order the destruction of the tools used to make the goods).
46. See ACTA Draft—Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 26, art. 2.15 (mandating that a
party must apply the penalties of imprisonment and high monetary fees where
necessary to deter future acts of counterfeiting and piracy).
47. For the outcome of an apparently fraught debate on imposing liability on
Internet service providers, see ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 2, art. 27.4.
48. See ACTA Draft—Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 26, art. 2.18 ¶¶5-8 (using such
language to refer to a party’s duty to safeguard the rights of authors, performers
and producers of phonograms, including infringement on their electronic
ownership and identifying mechanisms).
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enforcement and to convince their citizens of the importance of IP as
currently configured.49 Thus, a developing country that signs ACTA
will be obliged to commit resources to creating or subsidizing
domestic constituencies which would have incentives to further the
enforcement agenda.
The fourth chapter creates obligations for international
cooperation, information sharing, and capacity-building in making
ACTA operational for participating states.50 States parties are
required to dedicate resources to spread ACTA’s reach to nonparties,
in cooperation with the private actors whose interests ACTA
serves.51 Chapter Five essentially creates a new multinational
organization, consisting of a committee which can control its own
procedures, and sub-committees, which are empowered to invite
non-governmental bodies to participate in their processes.52 This
chapter also creates a mandatory consultation procedure that seems
to oust the operation of the WTO‘s Understanding on Rules and
49. See id. arts. 3.1, 3.4 (stipulating that parties should enact measures, collect
statistical data, and form advisory groups to promote specialization in and public
awareness of IP rights enforcement).
50. Id. arts. 4.1-4.3.
51. See id. art. 4.3.
1. Each Party shall endeavor to provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and
conditions, assistance in capacity building and technical assistance in improving
enforcement of intellectual property rights for Parties to this Agreement and, where
appropriate, for prospective Parties to this Agreement. Such capacity building and
technical assistance may cover such areas as:
(a) enhancement of public awareness on intellectual property rights;
(b) development and implementation of national legislation related to
enforcement of intellectual property rights;
(c) training of officials on enforcement of intellectual property rights; and
(d) coordinated operations conducted at the regional and multilateral levels.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, each Party shall endeavor to work closely with
other Parties and, where appropriate, countries or separate customs territories not a
Party to this Agreement.
3. Each Party may undertake the activities described in this Article in conjunction with
relevant private sector or international organizations. Each Party shall strive to avoid
unnecessary duplication of the activities described in this Article with respect to other
international efforts.

Id.
52. See id. art. 5.1 (establishing the ACTA Committee, which may take any
action that the committee deems necessary to carry out its functions, such as
reviewing implementation of ACTA, promoting its development, considering
amendments to it, approving accession of parties, establishing working groups, and
seeking the advice of non-governmental organizations).
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Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.53 The sixth and
final chapter sets out the procedure for the signature and entry into
force of the proposed treaty.54

IV. THE CONSTRUCTION OF COUNTERFEITING
The use of the term “piracy” in reference to copyright has
historically taken place outside of legal discourse—in rhetorical
efforts by interest groups seeking to change the law or public
perception. The term, as applied to copyright, has not had a clear
legal meaning.55 Earlier texts of ACTA used the term in reference to
an unspecified and undefined kind of infringement. The appearance
of such a vague, yet central rhetorical term in a draft international
instrument signals that the text is written entirely from the
perspective of the interest group that uses the term, if not by that
group itself. The term “piracy” parallels the term “counterfeit” in the
enforcement agenda and the text of ACTA.56 The October
consolidated text defines “pirated copyright goods” as:
53. See generally Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes art. 4, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (outlining the course
of action a state must take in requesting and entering into a consultation, such as
emphasizing the confidentiality of consultations and giving “special attention” to
the problems faced by developing countries). But see ACTA Draft—Oct. 2, 2010,
supra note 26, art. 5.3 ¶ 2 (providing that if a party requests a consultation with
another party, the consultation proceeding will stand without prejudice to rights
under any other proceeding, including under the WTO Rules).
54. See ACTA Draft—Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 26, arts. 6.1-6.2 (establishing
that ACTA will become enforceable 30 days after the sixth ratification,
acceptance, or approval of the agreement).
55. See PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM:
WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 26 (2002) (reiterating that the concept of
IP laws are difficult to define because of the inherent “fuzzy” nature of ideas); see
also ANTHEA WORSDALL & ANDREW CLARK, ANTI-COUNTERFEITING: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE 1 (1998) (noting that some jurisdictions, and even the use of
terms in different languages, do not associate piracy with copyright infringement).
See generally Debora Halbert, Intellectual Property Piracy: The Narrative
Construction of Deviance, 10 INT’L J. FOR SEMIOTICS L. 55, 55 (1997) (pointing
out that the idea of IP piracy is only recently becoming widespread as new
products and information technology expand).
56. See ACTA Draft—Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 26, arts. 2.14, 4.1, 5.1 ¶ 3
(delineating that parties should impose penalties on and work to prevent both
trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy because they are both components
of IP rights infringement).
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[A]ny goods that are copies made without the consent of the right holder
or person duly authorized by the right holder in the country of production
and that are made directly or indirectly from an article where the making
of that copy would have constituted an infringement of a copyright or a
related right under the law of the country in which the procedures set out
in Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Chapter 2 are invoked.57

The procedures referred to in the definition refer to obligations on
states to impose injunctions on violators. These injunctions can be
enforced without giving the defendant a right to a hearing and
without actual proof of damages. Punishment can also take the form
of destruction of property without compensation or an order for third
parties to furnish private information.
“Counterfeit” has borne a number of legal meanings, one of which
describes the large-scale production and sale of goods that bear an
intentionally deceptive resemblance to trademarked goods. Another
meaning relates to the integrity of state-issued currency.58 As the East
African experience shows, the term is used through ACTA as part of
the enforcement agenda’s goal of not only referring to goods subject
to copyright, patents, and other IP rights, but also to characterize
otherwise non-infringing conduct as an infringement and, in some
cases, a criminal offense. The term “counterfeit trademark goods”
was defined for the first time in the October consolidated text of
ACTA;59 however, the singular term “counterfeit” has not been
57. Id. art. 1.X.
58. Compare Stephen Mihm, No Ordinary Counterfeit, N.Y. TIMES¸ July 23,
2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/23/magazine/23counterfeit.html
(describing a well-made counterfeit dollar bill, known as a “supernote,” as
featuring the same high-tech, color-shifting ink as real American bills and with the
same composition of fibers), with Johanna von Braun & Peter Munyi, Note, New
Enforcement Mechanisms Challenge the Legality of Generics in the Name of
Public Health: The Emergence of Anti-Counterfeiting Legislation in Africa, 18
AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 238, 245 (2010) (referring to the Ugandan anticounterfeiting bill, which defined counterfeiting to include the manufacturing,
producing, or making an imitation of a protected good, both inside and outside
Uganda).
59. ACTA Draft—Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 26, art. 1.X. The December text
defines “counterfeit trademark goods” in Article 5(d) as:
[An]y goods, including packaging, bearing without authorization a trademark which is
identical to the trademark validly registered in respect of such goods, or which cannot
be distinguished in its essential aspects from such a trademark, and which thereby
infringes the rights of the owner of the trademark in question under the law of the
country in which the procedures set forth in Chapter II (Legal Framework for
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defined.
The use of “counterfeit” in the title of ACTA raises doubt whether
the term refers only to trademarked goods or to goods subject to
patents and other forms of IP, especially because the agreement
applies to a wide variety of forms of IP. “Counterfeit” as used in the
title and preamble has a vague but ominous meaning intended to
homogenize a heterogeneous set of regulations and practices.
WIPO adopted an agenda focusing on development, which
precipitated the enforcement agenda.60 The rights language employed
by the access to medicines and access to knowledge movements
rendered less effective the putative technocratic language of
“minimum standards,” which previously had been deployed to
maximize IP rights. The terms “counterfeiting” and “enforcement”
were therefore mobilized to invoke the language of security during
an era in which democratic governments in developed countries have
exhibited a tendency to let security trump human rights.

Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights) are invoked.

ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 2, art. 5(d). Any discussion of ACTA’s
provisions suffers from the secrecy of the process. At the time of this writing only
three public drafts had been released and two of those were redacted. The third,
distributed in October 2010, purported to require no further negotiations but was
indeterminate in key respects. Yet another draft dated November 15, 2010 has been
made public, with at least one significant change but without resolving other
important issues.
60. Two weeks after WIPO adopted the Development Agenda, United States
Trade Representative (“USTR”) Susan Schwab announced that USTR would seek
to negotiate ACTA in order to “set a new, higher benchmark for enforcement that
countries can join on a voluntary basis.” Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, Ambassador Schwab Announces U.S. Will Seek New Trade
Agreement to Fight Fakes (Oct. 23, 2007), http://www.ustr.gov/ambassadorschwab-announces-us-will-seek-new-trade-agreement-fight-fakes; see Ermias
Tekeste Biadgleng & Viviana Muñoz Tellez, The Changing Structure and
Governance of Intellectual Property Enforcement 26 (S. Ctr. Research Paper No.
15, Jan. 2008), available at http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2008/02151.pdf
(lauding the WIPO Advisory Committee on Enforcement in taking on a broad
mandate of IP rights enforcement, which will encourage developing countries to
implement TRIPS-plus standards, and emphasizing the importance of international
cooperation, especially with developing states, to encourage best practices of the
enforcement of IP rights using soft-law norm-setting principles in a “holistic
manner”).
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V. THREATENED EFFECTS OF ACTA ON
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
A. NEGATING MULTINATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The immediate effect of ACTA, even before considering the
pressure exerted on developing countries, is the exclusion of most
developing countries from international decision-making. Indeed,
ACTA is a means of circumventing WIPO and WTO processes.
India raised this concern in a letter to the WTO: “Another systemic
concern is that [IP rights] negotiations in [regional trade agreements]
and plurilateral processes like ACTA completely bypass the existing
multilateral processes.”61 Because WIPO is a United Nations
organization, it is duty-bound to pursue development. One
consequence of the abandonment of the commitment to multinational
decision-making is an effective disregard of the United Nations
Millennium Development Goals adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly.62 The response by leading emerging economies
such as India and China63 cannot be characterized as merely
representing national trade interests coincidentally at odds with those
of the negotiating countries. Instead, countries with emerging
economies are home to many of the world’s poorest people—those
who will be directly impacted by ACTA. For example, in India, the
world’s most populous democracy, some 456 million people live
below the poverty line.64
61. Intervention on TRIPS plus Enforcement Trends, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY
INT’L (June 10, 2010), http://keionline.org/node/864.
62. See United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000) (underscoring that countries must create policies on a
global level to ensure equitable and inclusive progress for developing countries
and countries in transition due to the uneven distribution of benefits and
disadvantages created by globalization).
63. See, e.g., Zhao Hong, Permanent Mission of China to the World Trade
Org., Proposal by China to WTO TRIPS Council (June 28, 2010), available at
http://keionline.org/node/883 (questioning the TRIPS-plus standards because they
will compel developing countries to use their limited resources for the benefit of IP
rights).
64. See New Global Poverty Estimates – What it Means for India, WORLD
BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/51QB3OCFU0 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011)
(remarking that even though the overall poverty rate in India is declining, the
number of poor people living below the poverty line has increased, and arguing
that it is necessary for India to deal with “inequalities in opportunities” in order to
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B. LIMITING ACCESS TO MEDICINE
ACTA threatens access to medicines through the indeterminacy of
the terms “counterfeit” and “enforcement.” Similarly problematic are
provisions that mandate injunctions against a broad class of actors,
including third parties, and mandate interception of goods in transit
by customs officials applying the IP law of the transit country.65 In
the “final” text, patents are excluded only from Section 3 of Chapter
2, which concerns border measures. The exclusion operates through
a footnote, raising the question: why it is not firmly placed in the
text?
Even if these provisions ultimately exclude pharmaceutical
patents—an exclusion that is not guaranteed given the lack of
accountability of the negotiators to elected lawmakers—trademark
and copyright claims can still be used to block generic medicines.
For example, in 2009 German customs officials seized and held a
shipment of the generic drug Amoxicillin, which was being shipped
through Germany to a least developed country.66 The drugs were held
for four weeks because German customs officials were confused by
the alleged similarity of the generic name Amoxicillin with the
GlaxoSmithKlein brand Amoxil.67 The incident highlights the
negative consequences for global health when customs authorities
are empowered and required to engage in determinations of IP rights
with respect to goods in transit.
How these provisions and subsequent developments will affect
access to medicines is further evidenced by two instances of the
enforcement agenda in the developing world: the East African
experience of new counterfeit legislation and the Dutch seizure of
generic drugs in transit. The East African countries of Tanzania,
promote growth).
65. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 2, arts. 8, 12.
66. See ICTSD, European Generic Drug Seizures Take Centre Stage at TRIPS
Council Meeting, 13 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., no. 21 June 10, 2009, at
6, available at http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/48330/ (commenting that the
official reason for seizing the Amoxicillin, which was en route to Republic of
Vanuatu, was to check the shipment for counterfeits, and describing that the
products were worth €28,000 and were held for four weeks until there was
confirmation that no trademark infringement occurred).
67. See id. (observing that this confusion is “the latest in the list of cases that
demonstrate that EU regulations are actively hampering timely access to medicines
to developing countries”).
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Kenya, and Uganda rely on generic drugs.68 Efforts by the European
Union and a group claiming a World Health Organization mandate
have resulted in “anti-counterfeiting” legislation in Tanzania and
Kenya and the beginnings of an “anti-counterfeiting” legislative
process in Uganda. The World Health Organization Secretariat
described the International Medical Product Anti-Counterfeiting
Taskforce (IMPACT) as “a partnership comprised of all the major
anti-counterfeiting players, including: international organizations,
non-governmental
organizations,
enforcement
agencies,
pharmaceutical manufacturers associations and drug and regulatory
authorities.”69 Historically, counterfeiting has referred to an
intentional violation of exclusive trademark rights on a commercial
scale. However, in East Africa, enacted or draft legislation defines
counterfeiting as infringement, including unintentional infringement,
of not only trademark, but also other IP rights, such as copyrights
and patents.70 The Kenyan legislation defines goods as “counterfeit”
if they infringe an IP right “in Kenya or elsewhere.”71 Consequently,
if a trademark or patent is not registered in Kenya, goods that
allegedly infringe such a right elsewhere in the world may be subject
to an injunction or seizure. This trend represents a marked departure
from the general rule of territoriality—where copyright, trademark,
and patent rights apply only within the jurisdiction that grants the
right.72
68. Wambi Michael, EU Supports Law Threatening Access to Medicines,
INTERPRESS SERVICE (Mar. 15, 2010), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=50661
(“The European Union [] is funding the drafting of Uganda’s controversial
Counterfeit Goods Bill, a proposed law that has caused an outcry as it threatens
access to life-saving generic medicines in this low income East African country.
Some [ninety] percent of medicines used in Uganda’s health-care system are
imported, of which about [ninety-three] percent are generics.”).
69. About Us, INT’L MEDICAL PRODUCTS ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TASKFORCE,
http://www.who.int/impact/about/en/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
70. See, e.g., von Braun & Munyi, supra note 58, at 243-46 (explaining that
Kenyan and Ugandan bills on counterfeiting govern trademark counterfeit,
copyright piracy, and “all other forms of intellectual property, such as patents and
plant breeders’ rights”).
71. See The Anti-Counterfeit Bill, No. 16 (2008), KENYA GAZETTE
SUPPLEMENT No. 51, pt. I(2) (making illegal the manufacturing, producing,
labeling, and re-packaging of protected goods, even outside Kenya).
72. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching
Trademark Law from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885, 887 (2004) (quoting
various sources, such as the United States Supreme Court, secondary sources on
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On April 23, 2010, the Kenyan High Court suspended the
application of the Act with respect to medicines, as it bans import
and manufacture of generic medicines and therefore infringes
constitutional rights.73 The campaign to pass the legislation claimed
that it was necessary to prevent sub-standard medicines and other
defective or even dangerous goods.74 The legislation requires the
state to devote resources to create agencies or to change the power of
existing agencies with the aim of establishing unknowing
infringement as a criminal offense.
ACTA explicitly requires countries to enable customs officials to
seize goods in transit at the behest of purported rights holders. This
provision is based on European regulations that have previously been
used to intercept generic medicines in transit.75 European Council
Regulations have been used on a number of occasions by Dutch
customs authorities to stop the transit of generic medicines lawfully
produced in India, being lawfully imported into developing
countries, but which happen to pass through European facilities.76
These seizures negate the freedom of transit guaranteed by Article 5
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.77 The Doha
trademarks and monopolies, and federal appellate courts, contending that “it is an
axiomatic principle of domestic and international trademark law that trademarks
and trademark law are territorial”).
73. The Kenyan High Court found that Act 13 of the 2008 Anti-Counterfeit Act
arguably bans the importation of generic medicines and so infringes constitutional
rights. They therefore issued an order suspending the application of the Act to
medicines, pending a full hearing on the issue. See Asero Ochieng’ v. AttorneyGen., (2010) Petition No. 409 of 2009 (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (ruling on file with
American University International Law Review).
74. Cf. von Braun & Munyi, supra note 58, at 250 (noting that Kenyan
individuals who are HIV-positive challenged the legislation on the grounds it will
hinder access to generics).
75. See Sean Flynn, ACTA and Access to Medicines, AM. U. WASH. C. L.
PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. & INTELL. PROP. BLOG (April 28, 2010, 2:57 PM)
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/acta-and-access-to-medicines
(explaining that the United States moved to expand injunctions against third parties
who may be unknowingly aiding infringers by using patented active
pharmaceutical ingredients in generics).
76. See Council Regulation 1383/2003, art. 11, 2003 O.J. (L 196) 7(EC)
(authorizing customs authorities to implement a “suspensive procedure” by
destroying goods they have detained because the goods may violate IP rights).
77. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 5, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (requiring that a vessel’s country of origin may not
interfere with the freedom of transit and specifying no distinction “based on the
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Declaration allows countries to manufacture, export, and import
generic medicine under compulsory licenses in certain
circumstances.78 The Dutch customs authorities, apparently unable or
unwilling to parse the complexities of the legal issues involved,
therefore seized the medicines unlawfully.79
Seeing the enforcement agenda in action confirms that aspects of
that agenda embedded in ACTA, including the seizure of goods in
transit and an expansive notion of “counterfeit,” already impede
access to medicines for people in developing countries.

C. LIMITING ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE
The range of policy discretion for developing countries was
massively reduced by TRIPS, which requires “minimum standards”
of IP protection.80 Developed countries have generally complied,
indeed many have exceeded the requirements of international
treaties, as borne out by research into African domestic practice.81
TRIPS imposed obligations to pass and adhere to laws, based not on
the conditions prevailing in developing countries, but rather
according to the requirements of trade offices in developed countries
which were acting at the behest of corporate constituencies. Studies
flag of vessels, the place of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination, or on any
circumstances relating to the ownership of goods, of vessels or of other means of
transport”).
78. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) (supporting the use of TRIPS to
further the public’s access to medicine by providing access, research, development,
and establishing a new Declaration).
79. TRIPS art. 31, read with paragraph 6 of the Doha declaration, allows
member states to issue compulsory licenses to manufacture and import generic
medicines in certain circumstances.
80. See TRIPS § 5 (setting out the minimum standards for patent protection by
establishing the minimum duration of protection, offering exclusions from patents
such as “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods,” excepting unreasonable
exploitative patents as prejudicial, and providing judicial review of revocation of a
patent).
81. See, e.g., Tobias Schonwetter et al., Copyright and Education: Lessons on
African Copyright and Access to Knowledge, 10 AFR. J. INFO. & COMM. 37 (2010),
available at http://link.wits.ac.za/journal/AJIC10-Schonwetter.pdf. This work
concluded that Egypt, South Africa, Morocco, Kenya, Ghana, Uganda, Senegal,
and Mozambique “afford copyright protection that complies with, and in many
cases exceeds, the standards reflected in the relevant international treaties and
agreements, including the Berne Convention and TRIPs.” Id. at 38-39.
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revealed the following:
Perhaps the most important revelation from this research is that copyright
laws in all study countries comply with international copyright standards.
In many cases, the African countries studied provide even greater
protection than international legal norms require. Thus, the countries
studied do not need advice or assistance in drafting legislation to bring
levels of legal protection up to par. Simply put, Africa does not need
stronger copyright laws. Realising this point is urgent, as some of the
study countries—Kenya, Ghana, South Africa—are in the midst of
revising, or planning revisions, to their copyright laws.82

In these circumstances it is not surprising that IP legislation and
practice diverge in developing countries. Research in Africa found
the following:
Access to learning materials is obtained primarily through activities that
infringe copyright. When—and if—the enforcement of sanctions against
copyright violation becomes a greater reality in the study countries, then,
without mechanisms in place to promote and ensure non-infringing access
to knowledge, many learners, particularly at the tertiary level, will be in a
precarious position and entire systems of education will be vulnerable.83

ACTA will require precisely the enforcement that will cut off
access to learning materials in such countries. While TRIPS
constrains what exceptions and limitations to exclusive rights a
country may exercise, it does not set out minimum exceptions.
Instead, ACTA makes the entire process of writing exceptions and
limitations far more complex than it was for developed countries,
which were free to create whatever exceptions they deemed
appropriate during their own development. Because of the speed with
which developing countries are expected to create complex IP
legislation—legislation that has been formulated over centuries by
developed countries—most developing countries have not
established appropriate balancing provisions that enable access to
knowledge. As a result, infringement in developing countries, even
widespread infringement, is a symptom of a system imposed from
outside, not suitable or even meaningful to many in the developing
world.84 Enforcement required by ACTA will deprive millions of
82. Id. at 49-50.
83. Id. at 50.
84. See id. (arguing that “the copyright environment can be improved by legal
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people of their only viable access to knowledge.

D. THE EFFECT OF BORDER MEASURES ON DEVELOPING COUNTRY
EXPORTS
Broadly-drafted border measures will allow global corporations to
exert pressure on developing country exporters, either barring them
from access to markets or extracting licensing fees from them. This
power was exercised in a campaign by Monsanto to prevent the
importation of soymeal from Argentina into Europe.85 Monsanto had
obtained a so-called “gene patent” in Europe and the United States,
which enabled it to exercise a monopoly over the supply of a
particular type of soybean for agricultural use.86 Monsanto did not
obtain a patent in Argentina, where crops of the bean were processed
to produce soymeal. Some of this soymeal was imported into Europe.
After a number of years without protest, Monsanto requested the
detainment of Argentinean shipments to Denmark, the Netherlands,
Spain, and the United Kingdom while making damages claims
against European importers of the soymeal.87 The claims were based
on alleged violation of the patent, and Monsanto argued that the
patented DNA sequences would, or could, survive in the meal, even
though the meal could not be used to grow a new crop of beans.
None of the cases brought by Monsanto have succeeded, and courts
reforms that make copyright more flexible and suitable to local realities [while]
less restrictive laws could provide more effective protection, because they would
enable entire segments of the population currently operating outside the copyright
system altogether to comply with limited, realistic rules”).
85. See Soy Imports Delayed as Argentina Fights Monsanto over GM, FOOD
PROD. DAILY (May 18, 2006), http://www.foodproductiondaily.com/SupplyChain/Soy-imports-delayed-as-Argentina-fights-Monsanto-over-GM
(reporting
that Monsanto is bringing claims against Denmark, the Netherlands, and Spain as
part of the company’s larger goal of compelling Argentine farmers to pay royalties
for Monsanto’s seeds).
86. See Carlos M. Correa, Enforcing Border Measures: Importation of GMO
Soybean Meal from Argentina, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 81-82 (explaining that Monsanto
patented the soybean in several countries but never attempted to obtain a patent for
it in Argentina).
87. See Oliver Balch, Seeds of Dispute, GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 2006),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2006/feb/22/gm.argentina (highlighting that
Monsanto’s suit against these countries alleged importation from Argentina
without a license, but noting that if Monsanto were successful, it could claim to
own part of any product that the gene was found in).
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have rejected the claim that the patent could prevent the importation
of an end product not covered directly under the patent.88 However,
in the interim, the customs officials had seized and delayed the
shipments and charged the importers detainment fees.
Even if patents are excluded from the ACTA section on border
measures, the current wording of that exclusion strongly suggests
that other agreements may well require those “border measures” with
respect to patents. The Monsanto case illustrates a strategic use of
alleged IP rights, and even when courts ultimately do not hold that
those rights apply to products further along a value chain to the rights
holder, these cases create considerable barriers to market entry for
developing country farmers. The campaign shows the potential of
border measures for anti-competitive conduct. Intermediaries such as
importers are likely to avoid such conflicts even if the law is not
clear, switching to new sources, especially those who have made
strategic use of broad border measures. The result for developing
country farmers, who lack the resources to fight sophisticated legal
battles on foreign terrain, is that they will lose markets for their
goods, thereby causing potentially devastating effects on rural
economies.

CONCLUSION
The impact of ACTA on developing countries will be far reaching,
given its broad scope encompassing different types of IP and its
inclusion of a range of measures—such as civil and criminal
penalties, border and information gathering requirements, and
mandatory government speech in favor of entrenched IP regimes. As
a consequence, it is not possible to fully describe the likely impact of
ACTA. However, an examination of other manifestations of the
enforcement agenda, of which ACTA is merely one, leaves little
doubt about the consequences for the world’s poor if ACTA
proceeds.
Below is a table listing some of the impacts ACTA will likely
have on development.
88. The European Court of Justice, for example, tied its holding against
Monsanto to the fact that the product in question was not the seed itself and
therefore did “not perform the function for which it was patented.” Case C-428/08,
Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cefetra BV, [2011] F.S.R. 6, at *191 (2010).
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TABLE 1. LIKELY EFFECTS OF ACTA ON DEVELOPMENT
Short Term

Medium Term

Long Term

Recruitment of some
developing counties to
support ACTA

Undermining of fragile
civil liberties and rule of
law

Anti-competitive
blocking of exports to
developed countries

Diversion of resources to
“enforcement”

Local political economies
of rent seeking
“enforcement”

Pressure to prevent
infringement that gives
access to learning
materials

Decreased access to
knowledge due to
measures in force in
developed countries

Pressure to adopt ACTAtype measures before
signing ACTA

Disruptive restructuring
of global trade routes

Interception of medicines
in transit

Decreased access to
export markets and
growing barriers to
international trade
Recruitment of public
and private security
sector as new
enforcement constituency

Institutionalization of the
enforcement agenda
Loss of policy space
remaining under TRIPS
Restrictions on access to
medicines, access to
learning materials, and
technology transfer—
causing development
failure leading to political
instability

Imposition of ACTA-plus
measures through
bilateral agreements

Many of these effects cannot be avoided simply by refusing to
accede to the treaty resulting from the ACTA negotiating process.
Instead, developing countries will be affected directly by
implementation of ACTA by the club of drafting countries. Some of
the effects, such as undermining the WIPO Development Agenda
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and sidelining WIPO—as well as the WTO, are already underway.
The most immediate impact of ACTA is that the leadership of many
of the world’s largest democracies, including Brazil and India, are
shut out of ACTA during negotiations even though it will be
imposed on them later. Since negotiations of the treaty have been
conducted largely in secret, it is difficult for developing countries
with limited resources to track the process and even harder to
respond to it through diplomatic channels.
In the short term, developing countries will continue to experience
the effects of enforcement through the interception of goods in
transit, including generic medicines. In the medium term, developing
countries will come under increasing trade pressure to adopt wide
ranging “anti-counterfeiting” measures, which threaten access to
medicines and access to learning materials. In the long term,
developing countries will also be pressured to agree to ACTA and
thereafter will be required to devote scarce resources to furthering
the commercial interests of a small but exceptionally powerful group
of multinational corporations, thereby further depriving their poorest
citizens of access to medicines and learning materials.

